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Is Sin Always a Sin? The Interaction Effect of Social Norms and Financial 
Incentives on Market Participants’ Behavior 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Using alcohol, tobacco, and gaming consumption data and people’s attitudes toward these sin 
products to proxy for social norm acceptance levels, we show a strong interaction effect between 
social norms and financial incentives, which significantly influence the behavior of market 
participants. Specifically, institutional investors’ shareholdings and analyst coverage of sin 
companies increase with the degree of social norm acceptance. The association between 
shareholdings/coverage and social norm acceptance is less pronounced for firms with higher future 
expected performance. Our results show that social norms and financial incentives have a powerful 
interaction effect in determining the behavior of market participants, suggesting that social norms 
can be crossed when motive and opportunity exist.   
 
 
 
JEL Classification: G11, D71,  M40. 
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Is Sin Always a Sin? The Interaction Effect of Social Norms and Financial 
Incentives on Market Participants’ Behavior 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Debate over the trade-off between private and social value of economic activities has 
continued for at least the past century. This debate reached a new climax in the past decade when 
a number of corporate scandals broke out due to the unethical behavior of economic agents. As a 
result, people began to re-think the ultimate objectives of agents and regulations (e.g., Pigou 2005, 
Cassidy 2009, Bayou, Reinstein, and Williams 2011). Extant literature shows that economic agents 
maximize short-term profits, but also suggests that socially responsible investors care about non-
financial incentives. Since the financial crisis of 2007/2008, the public has increasingly voiced their 
strong interest in knowing whether the social value of economic activities are sacrificed due to the 
incentives of market participants chasing financial rewards. 
  Experimental studies in the accounting literature have explored the interaction effect of 
financial incentives with professional ethics (Blanthorne and Kaplan 2008, Thompson and 
Loewenstein 1992, Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoff, and Camerer 1995, Hunton and Rose 
2008).  However, to date few empirical studies directly address how financial incentives interact 
with social norms (defined as a collection of ethical standards) in determining the behavior of other 
economic agents, including investment decisions of institutional investors and coverage decisions 
of financial analysts.  While the accounting profession has introduced significant guidance (or 
professional norms) on ethical behavior, we still see accountants/auditors/executives with 
economic incentives violating these norms and making self-serving decisions.  Such evidence is 
not rare.  For example, Hechter (2008), through an analysis of the rise and fall of the Arthur 
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Andersen accounting firm, shows that what appeared to have been an unshakable commitment to 
professional norms was highly contingent upon competing norms, macroeconomic conditions, and 
internal conflicts. Blanthorne and Kaplan (2008) find that taxpayers’ ethical beliefs do not arise 
independently from economic considerations, but instead are strongly influenced by opportunities 
to evade income taxes, i.e., the opportunity to evade influences the formation of one’s ethical 
beliefs, which, in turn, affects one’s intentions and decisions to evade.  Other papers, such as 
Thompson and Loewenstein (1992) and Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoff, and Camerer (1995), 
have also found an influence of self-interest on one’s ethical beliefs.  In a recent experiment, 
Hunton and Rose (2008) find that directors with multiple directorships are less willing to support 
required financial statements restatements due to the potential adverse effects of restatements on 
their reputation capital (namely, future income generating ability).  
Motivated by the interests of both academics and regulators, in this paper we examine 
whether social norms and financial incentives have a substitution effect in influencing the behavior 
of market participants regarding those firms in the alcohol, tobacco and gaming industries. These 
firms are called sin firms because there are social norms attached to their products, i.e., excessive 
consumption of alcohol, tobacco, and gambling generates negative externalities to society. 
Specifically, we examine the following market participants and their behavior: 1) institutions and 
their stock ownership decisions, and 2) financial analysts and their coverage decisions.  Hong and 
Kacperczyk (2009) suggest social norms are priced and show that sin stocks in the alcohol, tobacco 
and gaming industries, on average, have less institutional ownership and analyst coverage 
compared to other non-sin stocks.  We assert that social norms may not be adhered to when 
financial rewards are too enticing for some market participants. In other words, we explore whether 
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“money talks” when market participants have the dilemma of choosing between social norms and 
financial rewards.   
 To answer our research questions, we first investigate how social norms evolve over time. 
We use the consumption of alcohol, tobacco, and gaming as the proxies for the acceptance levels 
of the sins related to these products. Using Gallup survey data, we find these proxies are highly 
correlated with people’s attitude toward these sin products. We also find that the consumption of 
the sin products changes substantially over time and follow different evolution processes. Social 
norm acceptance levels for alcohol and tobacco have become lower while acceptance levels for 
gaming have increased. The dynamic nature of these proxies enables us to study the main effect of 
social norms and the interaction effect of social norms with the expected financial performance of 
sin firms on the investment decisions of institutional investors and the coverage decisions of 
financial analysts.  
We then conduct both univariate and multivariate regression analyses. We show that 
institutional ownership and analyst coverage of sin stocks are positively associated with the 
strength of social norm acceptance, i.e., sin stocks are shunned more when social norm acceptance 
is low (consumption of sin products is low). Such calibration extends the finding in Hong and 
Kacperczyk (2009) that sin stocks, compared to the wide universe of stocks, are held less by 
institutions and followed less by financial analysts. Furthermore, our results suggest a strong 
interaction effect between social norms and financial incentives of market participants. When a 
stock is expected to perform poorly, the price of obeying social norms is relatively cheap, leading 
to additional shunning by institutions and analysts. In contrast, when the stock is expected to 
perform well and the relative price of obeying social norms becomes high, institutional investors 
and analysts are shown to choose financial rewards over social norms by shunning fewer sin firms. 
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Our results survive from a number of additional robustness checks such as using time-varying sin 
exposure, alternative measures of expected financial performance, alternative proxies for social 
norms, and change analysis.   
Our study contributes to both the economics and accounting literature. First, we provide 
strong empirical support for a substitution effect between financial and non-financial incentives 
among economic agents. We show that when social norms interact with financial considerations, 
market participants will sacrifice their adherence to social norms for financial rewards. While such 
a finding sounds intuitive, large sample empirical evidence is scarce in the literature outside of 
numerous experimental studies dealing mostly with accounting professionals, audit committee 
members, auditors, and taxpayers. This finding adds to the current debate on why there could be a 
gap between the investment practices of Wall Street and the ethical standards of Main Street. Some 
ethical standards consistent with corporate social responsibility considerations are not necessarily 
profitable to follow.  As such, a gap between what is right to do (following ethical standards) versus 
what is profitable to do (investment practices) can form. Our finding is thus of particular interest 
to academics, investors, regulators, and various other stakeholders.  
Second, we add a level of richness to the previous literature by investigating how social 
norms evolve over time through the adoption of social norm proxies. Our research design and 
results highlight the importance of having direct empirical measures of social norms. Our use of 
changes in consumption of sin products as a proxy for the evolution of social norms towards sin 
stocks overcomes the drawback of assuming a constant social norms level over time; and thus 
extends previous studies by showing how social norms are priced in a dynamic setting.  Therefore, 
our results potentially shed light on why social norm effects are found to be weak, in aggregate, 
for certain periods in the previous literature (Hong and Kacperczyk 2009).  
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Finally, our findings have significant implications and importance in practice, especially in 
view of the aftermath of the recent financial crisis in which numerous individuals and companies 
have been accused of sacrificing social standards for financial gains. Extending our hypotheses to 
a more general context, one may predict that when existing social norms are interacted with a strong 
counteracting force, i.e. financial considerations, a real risk exists that these “compromises” 
become part of acceptable future social norms (Prentice and Miller 1996).   A “compromised” set 
of social norms may result in regulations and laws needing to be enforced to maintain social order.  
Such was the case with the failure of Arthur Andersen, and the subsequent passing of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act which was extremely expensive to both implement and enforce (Hechter 2008).    
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the background 
and develops the hypotheses. Section III describes the sample selection and methodology. Section 
IV discusses the empirical results. Section V concludes. 
   
II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
Social norms are rules and standards understood by members of a group that guide and 
constrain social behavior. More precisely, there are two types of social norms: descriptive norms 
and injunctive norms.  Descriptive norms refer to the prevalence of a given behavior (i.e. the 
number of people in a given population that smoke cigarettes) whereas injunctive norms refer to 
the degree of actual or perceived approval of a given behavior (Neighbors et al. 2007).  Descriptive 
and injunctive norms should be highly correlated because a popular behavior implies that many 
people approve of the behavior. These social norms develop as a result of interaction with others. 
Sanctions for deviating from them come from social networks as opposed to the legal system 
(Cialdini and Trost 1998). In the economics literature, the impact of social norms on economic 
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behavior and market outcomes was first studied in the context of the labor market. In the 
discrimination model of Becker (1957), agents pay for the discretionary tastes arising from 
community norms. They bear financial costs from their decisions to not enter into contracts with 
particular types of people. In an unemployment setting, Akerlof (1980) examined social norms and 
claimed that although social norms can be costly, they continue to exist because of the perceived 
loss of reputation to followers for diverting from these norms.  
Applied to socially responsible investing (SRI), it is generally understood that SRI 
encourages investors to avoid sin companies such as those companies involved in the production 
of alcohol, tobacco, and gaming. It is believed that investors with a socially responsible investing 
philosophy can somehow affect the practices of the firms in which they invest and thus improve 
“the efficiency of the economic system (in the broad sense of satisfaction of individual values)” 
(Elster 1989). As a result, shares of sin stocks should be held in smaller proportions by institutions 
subject to social norm pressures or with socially responsible investing objectives (Geczy, 
Stambaugh and Levin 2005). Moreover, since sell-side analysts who produce financial reports and 
analyses tend to cater to institutional investors, sin stocks should also be followed less by these 
analysts (Hong and Kacperczyk 2009). 
  Previous literature, through its use of a dummy variable to proxy for “sin”, implicitly 
assumes that strong social norms against sin stocks are constant over time and across different sin 
types. However, as documented by the sociology and economics literature, through a process of 
adaptation, social norms are not constant. Rather, they evolve over time in several different 
dimensions, including age groups, social classes, and social groups (Ostrom 2000; Azar 2004; 
Kolstad 2007).  To overcome this drawback, our study uses consumption data for sin products or 
services to proxy for the level of social norms in both cross-section and across time.  The use of 
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consumption data to proxy for social norms is consistent with the definition of descriptive norms 
and the proxies are highly correlated with injunctive norms, as we show later. In addition to raw 
consumption being the definition of a descriptive norm, previous literature has shown, for example, 
that injunctive social norms are strong predictors of gambling behavior (i.e. descriptive norms) and 
gambling-related negative consequences (Larimer and Neighbors 2003; Moore and Ohtsuka 1997; 
Moore and Ohtsuka 1999; Takushi et al. 2004). Our choice of consumption data relies on the 
assertion that the undesirable social consequences of alcohol, tobacco, and gaming, when 
consumed excessively, reflect the consensus social norms against consuming these products.  
Indeed, we find that whereas social norms against gaming have moderated significantly over the 
period from 1980 to 2007, the opposite can be said about alcohol and tobacco usage. Such new 
direct proxies allow us to conduct our study within each sin industry, avoiding the difficulty in 
choosing the appropriate control group as in the previous literature.   
Consistent with our support for the evolution of social norms, we argue that institutions and 
analysts have a lower demand for sin companies when social norms against the “sin” are stronger. 
Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) provide evidence that, on average, institutional ownership and 
analyst coverage are lower for sin companies than for non-sin companies in their full sample period. 
However, in several sub-periods, such a difference is not significant.1 Our argument potentially 
sheds light on the reason: at the time when social norms are weak in aggregate, it is possible that 
sin is not priced. We thus have the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1A:  Institutional ownership of sin stocks is associated positively with the strength of 
social norm acceptance.  
                                                          
1 For example, see Panel D of Table 3 in Hong and Kacperczyk (2009). 
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Hypothesis 1B:  Analyst coverage of sin stocks is associated positively with the strength of social 
norm acceptance.  
Previous studies on sin stocks implicitly assume that the effect of social norms is unconditional, 
i.e., it is independent of the firm’s financial performance. Extant studies document that institutional 
ownership and analyst coverage have a strong positive correlation with financial performance 
(McNichols and O’Brien 1997; O’Brien and Bhushan 1990; Sias, Starks and Titman 2006). 
Specifically, institutional investors invest when expected stock returns are high (e.g., Griffin, 
Harris and Topaloglu 2003; Cai and Zheng 2004) and analysts are more likely to provide forecasts 
and recommendations for stocks about which their true expectations are favorable (McNichols and 
O’Brien 1997). Akerlof (1980) develops a model expressing utility as a function of consumption, 
reputation, obedience/disobedience of a community’s code of behavior, and belief/disbelief in a 
community’s code of behavior.  He finds that a custom that is too costly to follow, in terms of lost 
utility, will not be followed; while a custom that is fairly costless to follow will, once established, 
continue to be followed because persons lose utility directly by disobeying the underlying social 
code and also because disobedience of social custom results in loss of reputation.  Applied to sin 
stocks, social norms against investing in these stocks are relatively easy to follow when the 
financial performance of alternative investments is strong. However, when the financial 
performance of all other stocks is falling relative to stocks that promote vice, as was the case in the 
early 2000s, this custom of not holding sin stocks becomes expensive to obey and will not always 
be followed.   
As Bayou et al. (2011) discuss at length, one of the critical roles of accounting is to provide 
corporations with the ability to assume a moral identity.  To the extent that studies (already 
described) show that accounting professionals can succumb to financial incentives, it is not 
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surprising that the benefits of complying with social norms are sometimes insufficient to overcome 
the costs of foregone high expected future returns in sin stocks.  The assertion that financial 
incentives can have a strong interaction effect with social norms for other financial market 
participants such as institutional investors and financial analysts, therefore, seems to be a 
reasonable conjecture. 
These arguments lead to the following hypotheses, where we include financial incentives 
and hypothesize that the impact of sin varies with the relative expected financial performance of 
sin stocks.   
Hypothesis 2A:  When expected financial performance of sin companies is strong, institutional 
ownership of sin stocks is less likely to be associated with the level of social norms.  
Hypothesis 2B: When expected financial performance of sin companies is strong, analyst coverage 
of sin stocks is less likely to be associated with the level of social norms.  
   
III. SAMPLE SELECTION AND VARIABLES 
3.1 Sample Selection 
Following Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), we identify a list of sin firms that are publicly 
traded and are involved in the alcohol, tobacco, and gaming industries.2  We start with the Fama 
and French (1997) classification of stocks based upon their SIC codes into 48 industries.  Stocks 
in the Fama-French industry group 4 (beer and alcohol – SIC codes 2100-2199) and industry group 
5 (smoke or tobacco – SIC codes 2080 – 2085) are classified as sin stocks.  Firms with NAICS 
                                                          
2 Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) dataset is available up to 2003.  We thank them for the use of their data set to verify 
our classification.  
  
11 
codes: 7132, 71312, 713210, 71329, 713290, 72112 and 721120 are identified as gaming stocks. 
In addition, we use Compustat Segments data to augment our sample by including firms that have 
segments operating in any of these SIC or NAICS groups.  A company is identified as a sin stock 
if any of its segments has an SIC code in either the beer or the smoke group or an NAICS code in 
the gaming group.  Since Compustat segments data are only available after 1985, our augmented 
search is limited to stocks still in existence as of 1985.  For these stocks, we back-fill our sample, 
i.e., those firms with any segments operating in sin industries are characterized as sinful for the 
years before 1985 as well.   
 We obtain daily closing stock prices, daily shares outstanding and all other return-related 
data from CRSP.  Annual information on a variety of accounting variables is obtained from 
Compustat. We restrict our study to companies with CRSP share codes of 10 and 11.  Institutional 
ownership data is from Thomson Reuters’ database of 13-F filings, including institutions that 
manage at least $100 million in assets.  Analyst coverage data is obtained from IBES.  Since 
institutional ownership and analyst coverage data only became available after 1980 and 1975 
respectively, we restrict our analysis to the period commencing from 1980.  GDP and 
unemployment data are obtained from the websites of the World Bank and the US Bureau of Labor 
Statistics respectively. 
 Unique to our paper is the construction of a social norm proxy for each of alcohol, tobacco, 
and gaming industries over time.  Each proxy is based on per capita consumption data obtained 
from several different sources. Alcohol statistics are obtained from the National Institute on 
Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism. Tobacco data is obtained from the United States Department of 
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Agriculture. Gaming data, based on visitor volume to Las Vegas as % of total US population, is 
obtained from the Las Vegas Convention and Visitors Authority.3   
3.2 Variables 
3.2.1 Measures of Social Norms 
Berkowitz (2004), in a review paper of the social norm approach to changing undesirable 
social norms, argues that actual drinking/gambling/smoking behavior (i.e. consumption levels) are 
best predicted by perceptions of drinking/gambling/smoking attitudes (i.e. perceived injunctive 
norms). For example, Larimer and Neighbors (2003), in a college gambling setting, show that 
social norms are strong predictors of gambling behavior and gambling-related negative 
consequences.  In this study, we assert that changes in consumption levels of alcohol, gaming, and 
tobacco over time serve as useful proxies for social norm acceptance of these activities. We also 
verify the close link between the consumption of these sin products and the attitude of survey 
participants toward these sins, based on survey data from Gallup Corporation, the Inter-University 
Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR), and the American Gaming Association4.   
                                                          
3 See Table 1 for the details of the sources. One might argue that the use of Las Vegas visitor volume is not an optimal 
measure as it does not consider % of visitors who are foreigners and it implicitly assumes that casinos are the only 
available gaming option as it excludes other gaming options such as on-line gambling. However, this is the only 
measure available over such an extensive period of time.  Data for the average number of annual trips to casinos per 
US gambler, available for the sub period 1993 to 2007 from www.americangaming.org, reveals that our gambling data 
trends are highly correlated with the alternative measures in the shorter sub-periods.   
4 Gallup Corporation has studied human nature and behavior for more than 75 years and employs many of the world’s 
leading scientists in management, economics, psychology, and sociology in identifying and monitoring behavioral 
economic indicators.  The ICPSR is funded by the United States Department of Health and Human Services.  There 
are two major ICPSR studies of interest in this paper: 1) the National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) – this 
provides quarterly and annual estimates on the use of alcohol and tobacco among members of United States households 
aged 12 and older; and 2) Monitoring the Future (MTF) – this explores changes in important values, behaviors, and 
lifestyle orientations of contemporary American youth i.e. 12th-grade students.  Finally, the American Gaming 
Association is the industry’s first national information clearinghouse, providing the public with timely, accurate 
gaming industry data. 
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3.2.2 Variables of Interest 
Institutional ownership and analyst coverage – institutional ownership is determined as of the end 
of the year and is calculated as the fraction of a firm’s shares held by institutions. Analyst coverage 
is defined as the natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts covering firm i at the end of 
year t.  If a stock is missing from IBES or does not have analyst forecast data as of the end of the 
year, the firm is recorded as having no analyst following. 
Expected financial performance – We measure firm expected financial performance as the market-
adjusted return over a one-year period multiplied by negative one, measured from the end of year 
t to the end of year t+1.  The market-adjusted return, which is calculated by subtracting market 
return from a firm’s buy-and-hold return, is multiplied by negative one to construct a performance 
weakness measure. Higher values correspond to weaker financial performance.  In robustness tests, 
we use analyst earnings forecasts and expected costs of capital as alternative proxies for expected 
financial performance.  
3.2.3. Control Variables 
 Since our empirical tests are designed to capture the relationship between social norm 
strength and market participants’ behavior, we control for firm characteristics that are known to be 
correlated with institutional ownership and analyst coverage in our multivariate tests.  Consistent 
with Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) and based on evidence related to predictors of institutional 
ownership compiled by Del Guercio (1996) and Gompers and Metrick (2001),  our control 
variables include size, market to book value, beta, stock price inverse, standard deviation of stock 
return, exchange dummy, and S&P 500 dummy. Moreover, following other previous literature (e.g. 
Bhushan 1989; Dechow and Dichev 2002; Kasznik 1999; Yu 2008), we also include lagged return 
on assets, growth rate of assets, external financing activities, a dividends dummy, interest rate and 
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market volatility.  To control for factors affecting the macro economy and thus the consumption of 
sin products, we include variables for the unemployment rate and GDP growth. Finally, we also 
control for firm fixed effects. Definitions of all variables are provided in the Appendix. 
 
IV. RESULTS 
4.1. Social Norms and Consumption of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Gaming 
We first examine the change in consumption of alcohol, tobacco, and gaming over time and 
then verify the correlation between the consumption of these products (descriptive norms) and the 
attitude of survey participants toward these products (injunctive norms). A good proxy for a social 
norm should indicate a high consistency between these two social norm types.  
Figure 1 shows the differences in consumption/social norms for each of these three products 
for the period 1980 to 2007. Panels A, B, and C represent the results from alcohol, tobacco, and 
gaming, respectively.  While the consumption measures for tobacco and alcohol have been 
decreasing for most of the period, there has been an uptrend for alcohol starting from the middle 
of the 1990s. With respect to gaming, it is clear that the social norm acceptance level has been 
increasing steadily over the years.  Increasingly, the government has been advertising the benefits 
from gaming revenues on social programs and decreased unemployment 
(www.safeandsecureig.org).  These different evolutionary processes highlight the dynamic nature 
of social norms and the importance of performing separate analyses on alcohol, tobacco, and 
gaming stocks. For comparison purposes, we also examine the time series of financial performance 
of sin stocks relative to market returns. Figure 1 shows the difference between the sin stock 
portfolio value weighted returns and market portfolio returns for the years 1980 to 2007.   This 
figure suggests that the returns of all three sin stock subgroups are volatile. However, these returns 
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in general move closely together and perform better than the broader market.  The only exception 
is the late 1990s when technology stocks were booming.   
We next verify whether our measures of sin product consumption are reliable measures of 
social norms in two different ways.  Using data from Gallup Corporation, the Inter-University 
Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR), and the American Gaming Association, we 
obtain alternative measures for both descriptive and injunctive norms.  As Table 1 illustrates, we 
collect survey results related to descriptive norms for the three sins as follows: 1) number of drinks 
in the last 7 days, 2) have had a drink within the past 30 days, 3) over the last two weeks, how 
many times have you had at least five drinks in a row, 4) % of people who have smoked cigarettes 
in the past week, 5) % of people who have smoked at least one pack per day, and 6) casino visitation 
(average number of annual trips to casinos per US gambler). Table 2, Panel A presents the 
correlation between the macro-consumption data (our social norm proxies) used in our main tests 
with these survey results of people’s consumption of sin products.  The high correlation between 
our macro-level consumption and the alternative sources of consumption related data (ranging from 
0.73 to 0.96) suggests that our variables effectively capture the actual consumption of alcohol, 
tobacco, and gaming.   
As Table 1 shows, we also collect survey results related to injunctive norms for alcohol, 
tobacco, and gaming companies as follows (all in % of respondents): 1) has drinking ever been a 
cause of problems in your family, 2) disapproval of people over age of 18 who try one or more 
drinks of an alcoholic beverage, 3) disapproval of people over age 18 who have five or more drinks 
once or twice each weekend, 4) harmfulness to try one or two drinks of an alcoholic beverage (% 
of respondents who say great risk), 5) harmfulness to have five or more drinks once or twice each 
weekend (% of respondents who say great risk), 6) perceived danger of second hand smoke, 7) 
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smoking should be made illegal, 8) risk if one smokes one or more packs of cigarettes per day, 9) 
disapproval of people over age 18 smoking one or more packs of cigarettes per day, and 10) how 
much do you think people risk harming themselves by smoking one or more packs of cigarettes per 
day (% of respondents who say great risk).  Table 2, Panel B presents the correlation between the 
main consumption measures used and the survey results of people’s attitude towards sin. Although 
the surveys do not cover our entire sample period, the correlation between our main macro-
consumption data and the survey results of people’s attitude towards sin is consistently negative 
and high, ranging from -0.42 to -0.93. This finding suggests that our consumption data reflects 
social norms toward sin products. 
4.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for our variables of interest and control variables. The 
mean institutional ownership for alcohol, tobacco, and gaming stocks is 18%, 34% and 27% 
respectively. These results are comparable to the 28% documented previously by Hong and 
Kacperczyk (2009) for sin stocks as a group. The mean analyst following for these same stocks is 
1.1, 2.0 and 1.5 respectively.  Again, this finding is comparable to the 1.7 previously documented 
by Hong and Kacperczyk (2009). Also of note is the positive mean and abnormal positive returns 
realized by holding sin stocks (0.6%, 0.9%, and 0.1% for alcohol, tobacco, and gaming stocks 
respectively) as well as the relatively low market risk beta for alcohol and tobacco stocks (means 
of 0.657 and 0.741 respectively). Finally, in unreported analysis, the correlation between 
institutional ownership (analyst coverage) and size is high at 0.462 (0.750) as is the correlation 
between institutional ownership and analyst coverage (0.536). These observations are consistent 
with previous literature which shows that institutional investors tend to hold large firms and that 
analysts tend to cater to institutional investors by providing financial reports and analyses on 
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companies that have high institutional ownership. In each regression model, we winsorize variables 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
4.3. The Effect of Social Norms and Financial Incentives on Institutional Ownership and 
Analyst Coverage 
4.3.1 The Primary Effect of Social Norms  
To test hypotheses H1A and H1B, we estimate the following regressions within each of 
the three sin stock subgroups: 
itittit ControlsSocialNormVariableDependent HDDD  210_              (1) 
where the dependent variables consists of institutional ownership and analyst coverage.5 Social 
norm is defined as the raw consumption of alcohol, tobacco, or gaming. Unlike Hong and 
Kacperczyk (2009) and Kim and Venkatachalam (2011), who use non-sin stock firms as a control 
group, we run regressions within each sin stock subgroup. The benefits of our approach are two-
fold: first, we avoid the controversy of choosing the appropriate control group; and second, this 
approach facilitates the investigation of our research question – how social norms and financial 
incentives interplay to determine the behavior of market participants. Such an innovation is 
necessary as Figure 1 shows the evolution process differs across the three sin stock subgroups and 
financial performance of sin stocks varies widely during our sample period. The effects of social 
norms on institutional ownership/analyst coverage may be cancelled out in a pooling regression. 
                                                          
5 For analyst coverage, we adopt a negative binomial regression model using maximum likelihood estimation (rather 
than an OLS regression) because analyst coverage consists of count data.   In a negative binomial regression model, 
the variance is not constrained to equal the mean, which is consistent with our data where the variance is larger.  An 
alternative is using a Poisson regression model, where the mean and variance are equal.  These results, which yield the 
same inferences, are discussed in the robustness checks section.    
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We predict that institutional ownership and analyst coverage are higher when social norm 
acceptance levels are higher. Thus, the coefficient 1D  in the regression model (1) is expected to be 
significantly positive. Table 4, Model 1A presents the regression results for institutional ownership. 
It shows that, across all three sin subgroups, strong social norm acceptance levels have a 
significantly positive effect on institutional ownership, consistent with our predictions. The t-
statistics for institutional ownership are 1.74, 3.05, and 5.32 for the social norms related to alcohol, 
tobacco, and gaming products, respectively. The coefficient on social norms implies that a one 
standard deviation increase in social norm acceptance results in a 7%, 17%, and 14% increase in 
institutional ownership for alcohol, tobacco, and gaming industries, respectively.  
Table 4, Model 1B presents the regressions for analyst coverage. The z-statistics for analyst 
coverage are 2.30, 3.03, and 2.19 for social norms related to alcohol, tobacco, and gaming 
companies. In addition, size is significantly positive across all three subgroups, suggesting that 
institutional investors/analysts are more likely to invest/follow larger firms. Finally, stocks with 
higher standard deviation of return and stocks in the S&P 500 index have less institutional 
ownership, consistent with Falkenstein (1996) and Hong and Kacperczyk (2009). 
4.3.2 The Interaction Effect of Social Norms and Financial Incentives  
To test the interaction effect, we first conduct a univariate analysis followed by a 
multivariate analysis. Figure 2, Panels A and B show the results for institutional ownership and 
analyst coverage for alcohol, tobacco and gaming subgroups separately. Expected financial 
performance, rather than actual financial performance, is used in this analysis because institutions 
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and analysts presumably base their investment/coverage decisions primarily on future expectations. 
We use actual stock returns in the subsequent year to proxy for the expected financial performance.6   
The first cluster of results in Figure 2  (Panels A and B) represent the sample firm-year 
observations that are subject to low social norm acceptance levels for sin stocks and where the 
firm’s expected market-adjusted financial return is below the sample median (i.e. these firms are 
expected to underperform the benchmark in the future). In contrast, the last cluster of results 
contains firms that are subject to high social norm acceptance levels for sin stocks and where the 
firm’s expected market-adjusted return is above the sample median. Of all four clusters, 
institutional ownership and analyst coverage are predicted to be the smallest (largest) in the first 
(last) cluster. This expectation is consistent with the results. The difference between institutional 
ownership (analyst coverage) between the first and last clusters is consistently negative across all 
three sin stock subgroups. With respect to institutional ownership, the decrease in ownership going 
from the last cluster to the first cluster is 8.5%, 19.0%, and 24.4% for alcohol, tobacco, and gaming 
stocks respectively.  With respect to analyst coverage, going from cluster four to cluster one, the 
decrease in the number of analysts following a given firm is 1.05 for alcohol firms, 3.01 for tobacco 
firms, and 2.42 for gaming firms. The differences in institutional ownership and analyst coverage 
between the two subgroups are significantly different from zero at  the 5% significance level for 
all three sin products except for analyst coverage for tobacco which is significant at the 10% level 
(t=1.94).   
                                                          
6 In robustness tests, we use a future return indicator variable, analyst earnings forecasts, and expected costs of capital 
as alternative proxies for expected financial performance.  
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For our multivariate analysis, we add the interaction term of Social Norms *Performance 
Weakness into regression equation (1). Performance weakness is defined as the market-adjusted 
expected return multiplied by negative one, and social norms is as defined previously. Social Norms 
* Performance Weakness is the main variable of interest, capturing the impact of social norms on 
institutional ownership and analyst coverage conditional on expected financial performance.  
We predict that the positive impact of high social normal acceptance levels on institutional 
ownership (analyst coverage) is strengthened when expected financial performance is weak.  
Analogously, we predict that high social norm acceptance levels moderate the negative association 
between expected financial performance weakness and institutional ownership (analyst coverage). 
Thus, the coefficient of the interaction term Social Norms * Performance Weakness is expected to 
be significantly positive. The coefficient on Social Norms is expected to be significantly positive, 
consistent with hypotheses 1A and 1B; the coefficient on Performance Weakness, representing the 
impact of expected future performance weakness on institutional ownership (analyst coverage), is 
expected to be negative. A negative sign would indicate that institutions (analysts) avoid firms with 
weaker expected future performance.      
Table 5, Models 2A and 2B report the results from the regression for institutional holdings 
and analyst coverage, respectively.  Consistent with our expectations, the coefficients on Social 
Norms and the Social Norms*Performance Weakness interaction term are all significantly positive 
while the coefficients on Performance Weakness are all significantly negative. Since performance 
weakness is defined as market-adjusted return over a one-year period multiplied by minus one 
(measured from the end of year t to the end of year t+1), higher expected future performance 
translates into a more negative performance weakness measure. Thus, the results suggest that when 
a firm’s future performance is expected to be good, institutional investors (analysts) will be less 
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concerned about social norms. Analogously, institutional investors (analysts) will be more 
concerned about social norms when a firm’s future performance is expected to be weak.   
To provide some clarity to the discussion above, we calculate that the marginal effect of 
social norms on institutional ownership is 32.9% for alcohol firms with poor financial performance 
(lower quartile) versus 27.5% for firms with good financial performance (upper quartile).7 
Analogously, we calculate that the marginal effect of performance weakness on institutional 
ownership is -3.5% for alcohol firms with low social norm acceptance levels (lower quartile) versus 
-1.8% for firms with high social norm acceptance levels (upper quartile).  Similar directional results 
apply for tobacco and gaming firms as well as for analyst coverage across all sin stock types.8   In 
addition to the main variables of interest noted above, Table 5, Models 2A and 2B show that 
institutional ownership (analyst coverage) is increasing in firm size. These results are consistent 
with those found in Table 4, Models 1A and 1B. Finally, the inclusion of the performance weakness 
and social norms/performance weakness interaction terms does not materially change the sign and 
significance of the other control/explanatory variables.  
                                                          
7 To calculate the marginal effect of social norms on institutional ownership for alcohol firms with poor financial 
performance, we use the mean of performance weakness for firms belong to that lower quartile (which equals 0.015) 
multiplied by the coefficient for “Social norms*performance weakness” in Table 5 (which equals 1.289), plus the 
coefficient for “Social norms” (i.e. 0.015*1.289+0.310=0.329). Similarly, the mean of performance weakness for firms 
belong to the upper quartile (which equals -0.027) is used to calculate the marginal effect of social norms on 
institutional ownership for alcohol firms with good financial performance (i.e. -0.027*1.289+0.310=0.275). 
8 For analyst coverage, the marginal effect of social norms on analyst coverage is calculated by holding independent 
variables at their mean (this is due to the fact that we adopt a negative binomial regression model using maximum 
likelihood estimation). The marginal effect of social norms for alcohol firms with poor (good) financial performance 
is 0.210 (0.144).   
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4.3.3. The Effect of Social Norms and Financial Incentives on Institutional Ownership: 
Subgroup Analysis 
We strengthen our analyses using five different classes of institutions defined in the 
Thomson Financial 13F database. We expect type 3 (mutual funds) and type 4 (independent 
investment advisors) institutions, who are natural arbitrageurs in the market, to be less constrained 
by social norms than other types of institutions whose positions in stocks are public information, 
institutions with diverse constituents, and institutions that can be readily exposed to public scrutiny, 
i.e. type 1 (banks), type 2 (insurance companies) and type 5 (all other institutions, including 
universities, employee stock ownership plans, etc.). Therefore, we divide the institutions in our 
data set into two subgroups: we group types 1, 2 and 5 in one group; and types 3 and 4 in a second 
group.   Panel A of Table 6 shows the regression results of institutional ownership on social norms 
and other control variables. For group 1 (types 1, 2 and 5), across all sin stock types, institutional 
ownership is increasing in social norm acceptance. The coefficients on social norms are statistically 
significant at two-tailed 5% (alcohol) and 1% (tobacco and gaming) levels. The coefficient on beta 
is significantly negative, indicating that more risky stocks are held less by banks, insurance 
companies, and other institutions. Institutional ownership of this group for alcohol, tobacco and 
gaming stocks is also associated negatively with inclusion in the S&P 500 and daily stock return 
standard deviation (except for alcohol). For group 2 (types 3 and 4), the impact of social norms on 
institutional ownership is insignificant for two out of three types of “sin” (alcohol and gaming). 
The t-test results on differences in coefficients on Social Norms between the two subgroups are 
reported at the bottom of Table 6, Panel A. For alcohol companies, the difference in regression 
coefficients on Social Norms between group 1 and group 2 is 0.262 with a t-statistic of 5.24.  This 
t-statistic suggests a significantly different impact of social norms on institutional ownership for 
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these two groups. The results are similar for tobacco and gaming companies.  These findings are 
consistent with our expectation that mutual funds and independent investment advisors are less 
concerned about social norms than other types of institutions and that they are more likely to play 
the role of arbitrageurs and buy sin stocks.  
Table 6, Panel B presents the regression results of institutional ownership on social norms 
and performance weakness by subgroups of institutional ownership.  Consistent with Hypothesis 
2A and 2B, Panel B shows that type 1, 2, and 5 institutional investment decisions are more likely 
to be driven by a comprehensive consideration of social norms and financial incentives (compared 
to type 3 and 4 institutional investors).  These results are confirmed by the significantly positive 
coefficients on Social Norms and the interaction term Social Norms * Performance Weakness, and 
a significantly negative coefficient on Performance Weakness for types 1, 2, and 5 but mostly 
insignificant coefficients for types 3 and 4. The sign and significance of all control/explanatory 
variables are consistent with the regressions in the previous section; namely, institutional 
ownership for types 1, 2, and 5 are increasing in firm size and social norms and decreasing in beta 
and standard deviation of return. The t-test results on differences in coefficients on Social Norms 
and on Social Norms*Performance Weakness between the two subgroups are reported at the 
bottom of  Table 6, Panel B. Consistent with our predictions, there is a significant difference in 
coefficients between the two subgroups for all three sin industries. 
In summary, our findings in subsection 4.3 suggest that the behavior of market participants 
(institutions and analysts) dynamically changes with the level of social norms and financial 
incentives. The evidence extends the insights provided by Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) that sin 
stocks have higher expected returns than otherwise comparable stocks. They attribute the finding 
to the fact that sin stocks are neglected by constrained investors and also face greater litigation risk 
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heightened by social norms. Focusing on sin stocks themselves, we avoid the measurement errors 
in the proxies for litigation risk and investor’s attention which are different across sin and non-sin 
stocks. Our finding suggests social norm constrained investors may not neglect sin stocks; 
otherwise, they would not adjust their sin stock holdings and coverage dynamically in response to 
changes in social norms.  
4.4. Additional Analyses and Robustness Checks 
 We conduct a set of additional analyses to test the robustness of our conclusions.  Results 
discussed but not tabulated in this section are available upon request.  
4.4.1 Time-Varying Measure of Firms’ Sin Exposure 
 In the previous section, firms’ exposure to sin is assumed to remain constant over time. 
While the social acceptance of sin is time-varying, firms’ exposure to sin could also vary across 
time. We extend our analysis and further test whether the perception of sin companies varies with 
the revenue from sin products. We obtain historical segment data for each firm-year and construct 
a new indicator variable – Sin Exposure, which equals 1 if the firm’s revenue generated by sin 
segments as a percentage of the firm’s total revenue is greater than the industry median for the 
year; and 0 otherwise. The higher the proportion of a firm’s revenue that is generated by sin 
segments, the more sin exposure it faces. We then include this new indicator variable Sin Exposure 
and the interaction terms of Sin Exposure with Social Norms and Performance Weakness measures 
into our regression models. The empirical results are reported in Table 7, Panels A and B. Our ex-
ante prediction is that for firms which have above-median sin exposure (i.e., Sin Exposure = 1), 
social acceptance of sin has a stronger effect on institutional investors’ shareholding/analyst 
coverage (hypothesis 1A/1B) as well as the relation between institutional investors’ 
shareholding/analyst coverage and future expected performance (hypothesis 2A/2B). In other 
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words, the coefficient on the interaction term Social Norms * Sin Exposure (Table 7, Panel A) and 
Social Norms * Performance Weakness * Sin Exposure (Table 7, Panel B) is expected to be 
significantly positive. Our empirical results are consistent with our predictions. 
 4.4.2 Correlation between Social Norms and Financial Performance 
One potential issue with using consumption data as a social norm proxy is that consumption 
data can also be thought of as a primitive proxy for demand. Unexpected increases in demand 
should affect future cash flows, which in turn affects accounting and stock returns. As such, one 
may argue that our results will be affected by the following relationship: increased consumption 
leads to higher profits, which in turn leads to increased analyst following and institutional 
ownership. In our opinion, this relation cannot explain why financial performance goes up while 
consumption goes down, which has been generally the case for alcohol and tobacco industries, as 
Figure 1 illustrates. Figure 1 shows that the social norm and financial performance plots are not 
correlated. The correlations between ROA and our consumption based social norm proxies are only 
0.126, 0.003, and -0.111 for alcohol, tobacco, and gaming industries respectively. In addition, to 
further address concerns that consumption data is nothing more than a primitive for demand/net 
income and that consumption data may be highly correlated with other macroeconomic factors 
(such as unemployment rate and GDP) which have nothing to do with social norm acceptance 
levels, we first regress the consumption data on unemployment rate, GDP and industry-level ROA 
as follows: 
ttttt AIndustryROGDPntRateUnemploymeSocialNorm HDDDD  3210          (2) 
where industry-level ROA is calculated as total earnings divided by total assets for alcohol, tobacco 
and gaming industries, respectively. We use the residuals from the above regression, which are 
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orthogonal to economic factors, to proxy for social norms. We then re-run our regressions presented 
in the previous sections. The results remain robust. 
4.4.3 Alternative Proxies for Financial Performance 
One potential concern about the performance weakness measure used in our regressions is 
whether realized return is a good proxy for ex ante expectations of future returns. To mitigate this 
concern, we adopt two alternative proxies to measure performance. First, we use analyst earnings 
forecasts as a proxy for ex ante expectations of future returns. The performance weakness measure 
is then calculated as the difference between the realized earnings in year t and one-year consensus 
median analyst forecast for year t+1, scaled by the stock price at the end of year t.  
Second, we estimate firm-year beta using a rolling window of the past five years of monthly 
stock returns.  Combining this firm-year beta estimate with expected market returns, equal to the 
past 10 year average equity return, and the current risk-free rate, we are able to use the CAPM 
model to generate expected future returns. Our results are robust to each of these alternative proxies 
and are available from the authors upon request.   
Finally, we rerun our regressions using a binary measure of expected financial performance. 
Performance weakness is defined as a binary variable equal to 1 if the firm’s realized return next 
year is below the industry median, and 0 otherwise. This choice not only helps interpret the 
interaction effects of social norms and financial performance on market participants’ behaviour, it 
also mitigates the concern whether institutions can precisely predict a firm’s future returns. The 
untabulated regression results are similar to the results when expected performance is a continuous 
measure.  
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4.4.4 Alternative Social Norm Proxies  
 In section 4.1, we verify that the consumption of sin products is associated with the attitude 
toward sin products by using survey results from Gallup Corporation and the Inter-University 
Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). While the time series availability of Gallup 
data, ICPSR data, and American Gaming Association data in some cases is not as extensive as the 
consumption data used in our main tables, the sixteen questions cover a wide variety of both 
injunctive and descriptive norm proxies.  Because the time series correlation between these 
measures from Gallup Corporation, ICPSR, and the American Gaming Association are between 
42% and 96% (average correlation of 77%), we include these new measures proxying social norms 
in lieu of our main proxies in each of our multivariate analyses.  In most cases, our results are 
robust and significant.    
4.4.5 Changes Analysis 
 
 Our main empirical analyses adopt a levels approach. To mitigate the concern of correlated 
omitted variables, we perform changes analyses for our main models. The empirical results of the 
changes analyses are reported in Table 8.  Table 8, Panel A (changes analysis, hypothesis 1A/1B) 
is analogous to Table 4 (levels analysis, hypothesis 1A/1B).  With the exception of tobacco for 
changes in institutional ownership, the inferences we draw from the changes analysis are the same 
as the levels analysis i.e. the coefficient on Social Norms is both positive and statistically 
significant.  Table 8, Panel B (changes analysis, hypothesis 2A/2B) is analogous to Table 5 (levels 
analysis, hypothesis 2A/2B).  Again, the inferences we draw from the changes analysis are the 
same as the levels analysis i.e. the coefficient on the Social Norms * Performance Weakness 
interaction term is both positive and statistically significant for all sin types and for both changes 
in institutional ownership and analyst coverage.  In general, the signed statistical significance for 
  
28 
most control variables is also consistent with the levels analyses. The t-values/z-values associated 
with the coefficients, as well as the adjusted R-square/pseudo R-square values, are mostly smaller 
than the levels analysis equivalents.  The lower levels of statistical significance associated with the 
changes analyses are consistent with other accounting studies.               
4.4.6 Other Issues Related to Model Specifications 
 While we highlight the benefits of running regressions within each sin stock subgroup and 
examining the evolutionary process of social norms in Section 4.3, the approach may suffer from 
correlated omitted variables. To mitigate this concern, in addition to the analyses already performed 
in Section 4.4.5 above, we conduct a random sampling analysis. Specifically, we select a random 
sample of firms from non-sin industries where the number of non-sin firms equals the number of 
sin firms in each sin industry for each year. We then rerun our regressions. We repeat this random 
sampling regression 100 times for each sin industry. We calculate the mean of the coefficients and 
the t-values. Our analyses show that neither the coefficients on the social norm variable nor those 
on the interaction terms of social norms and performance weakness are significantly different from 
zero.    
 Following Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), we adopt a standard OLS regression model for 
our analysis on institutional ownership. However, as the institutional ownership variable is 
bounded at zero and one, there is no guarantee that the fitted values will always lie within the 
feasible range. As such, we also applied a generalized linear model with a logit link and the 
binomial family to our sample. The new model guarantees that the predicted value of the dependent 
variable (i.e., institutional ownership) is bounded between zero and one. The untabulated results 
show that the inferences we draw from the regression results remain the same. 
  
29 
 Following previous literature, we adopt a log transformation of analyst coverage in an OLS 
framework for our analyses on analyst coverage. To check the robustness of our results, we also 
applied a Poisson model to our sample. The inferences remain the same. 
   
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Using alcohol, tobacco, and gaming consumption data and people’s attitudes toward these 
sin products to proxy for the social norm acceptance level, we investigate how the investment 
decisions of institutional investors and the coverage decisions of financial analysts are affected by 
the financial performance of sin companies and related social norms. We find that institutional 
investors’ shareholdings and analyst coverage of “sin” companies are increasing in the degree of 
social norm acceptance and that the association between shareholdings/coverage and social norm 
acceptance is less pronounced for firms with higher future expected performance. 
While in the accounting profession, the interaction between financial incentives and ethics 
has been debated for many years, little research has been done in economics and finance due in 
part to the maintained assumption that economic agents are modeled as maximizing utilities based 
on economic gain. We provide strong empirical support for a substitution effect between financial 
and non-financial incentives among economic agents. We show that when social norms interact 
with financial considerations, market participants, namely institutional investors and financial 
analysts, will forego their adherence to social norms for financial rewards. This finding is important 
and should be of interest to academics, investors, standard setters, and various other stakeholders, 
given the recent financial crisis. Our research question, research design and findings highlight the 
importance of having empirical measures of social norms. By using changes in consumption of sin 
products as a proxy for the evolution of social norms towards sin stocks, we document the distinct 
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evolutionary process of social norms related to different sin products (alcohol, tobacco, and 
gaming). We thus overcome the drawback of assuming a constant social norms level over time and 
extend previous studies by showing how social norms are priced in a dynamic setting.  
Future research could examine whether financial and social norm considerations interact in 
a similar way in other countries, and explore the differential impact of ethics and financial 
incentives on behavior in an organizational versus an individual setting. Booth and Schulz (2004) 
have started to explore this line of research in an experimental setting, finding that regardless of 
their level of individual ethical reasoning, a strong ethical corporate environment may lead to a 
general tendency for managers to act in the interests of their organizations. In the current version 
of this paper, both social norms (consumption and survey based) and institutional ownership and 
analyst coverage are domestic variables. Due to this data limitation, we are not able to generalize 
our results to the global level. However, we strongly believe that identifying the boundary of social 
norms and its impact on market stakeholders is an emerging area of interest; one that will continue 
to provide useful insights to our society in the future.    
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APPENDIX  
Variable  
  
Definition 
  
Institutional ownership  The fraction of the shares of company i held by institutions 
at the end of year t. This is calculated by aggregating the 
shares held by all types of institutions at the end of the year 
and then dividing this amount by shares outstanding at the 
end of the year. 
  
Analyst coverage Logarithm of one plus the number of analyst estimates 
issued on a company at the end of the year t. Stocks that do 
not appear in IBES are assumed to have no analyst 
estimates. 
 
Consumption (social norm proxy) Alcohol consumption is the recorded adult (15+) per capita 
consumption of alcohol in gallons for the year t.  Tobacco 
consumption is the domestic per capita consumption of 
tobacco in pieces for the year t.  Gaming consumption is 
the number of gaming visitors to Las Vegas as a % of the 
total population for the year t. 
 
Financial performance Market-adjusted return over one-year calculated by 
subtracting market return from a firm’s buy-and-hold return 
for the year t. 
 
Performance weakness The expected financial performance of the firm multiplied 
by negative one, where the expected financial performance 
is the market-adjusted return over year t+1 calculated by 
subtracting market return for year t+1 from a firm’s buy-
and-hold return for year t+1. 
 
Size Logarithm of the market value of equity of the company in 
year t. 
 
Beta Firm’s systematic risk calculated using the past five years 
of monthly return. 
 
Inverse of stock price One over the stock price at the end of year t. 
 
Std of return Daily stock return standard deviation during the past fiscal 
year t. 
 
NASD One if the stock is listed on Nasdaq; and zero otherwise. 
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Variable  
  
Definition 
  
SP500 One if the stock is in the S&P 500 index; and zero 
otherwise. 
 
Lagged return on assets Net income for year t-1divided by the average of total 
assets for year t-1. 
 
Growth rate of assets Change in total assets from year t-1 to year t scaled by total 
assets for year t-1. 
 
External financing activities The sum of net proceeds from equity financing and debt 
financing in year t scaled by total assets of the year t. The 
proceeds from equity financing are measured as net cash 
received from the sale of common and preferred stock less 
cash dividends paid. The proceeds from debt financing are 
measured as net cash received from the issuance (and/or 
reduction) of short- and long-term debt. 
 
Dividends One if the firm issued a dividend in year t; and zero 
otherwise. 
 
Interest rate Interest rate reported by the Federal Reserve in year t. 
  
Market volatility Monthly value-adjusted stock market return volatility over 
year t. 
 
GDP US per capita GDP in thousands of dollars for the year t; 
adjusted for inflation.   
  
Unemployment US unemployment rate for the year t.   
 
Sin exposure One if the firm’s revenue generated by sin segments over 
the firm’s total revenue is greater than the industry median 
for the year t; and zero otherwise. 
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Table 1. 
Descriptive Statistics of Social Norm Measures 
  Mean Median Standard  
Deviation 
Source and period 
Alcohol 
Alcohol consumption (US per 
capita in gallons) 
 
2.37 2.29 0.22 www.niaaa.nih.gov 
1980-2007 
Note: this is the primary measure used in 
regressions 
Number of drinks in last 7 days 
(around date of survey) 
 
4.03 4.00 0.21 www.gallup.com 
1996-2007 
Have had a drink within past 30 
days (%) 
 
59.50 58.00 3.63 Michigan,*  NSDUH database 
1982-2007 
Over the last two weeks, how many 
times have you had at least five 
drinks in a row (% of respondents) 
32.31 30.50 4.94 Michigan, MTF database 
1980-2007 
Has drinking ever been a cause of 
problem in your family (% of 
respondents) 
26.14 23.50 5.96 www.gallup.com 
1980-2007 
Disapproval of people over age of 
18 who try one or two drinks of an 
alcoholic beverage (% of 
respondents) 
 
24.90 26.20 4.59 Michigan, MTF database 
1980-2007 
Disapproval of people over age 18 
who have five or more drinks once 
or twice each weekend (% of 
respondents) 
64.08 64.85 4.11 Michigan, MTF database 
1980-2007 
Harmfulness of trying one or two 
drinks of an alcoholic beverage (% 
of respondents who say great risk) 
 
6.95 7.45 1.89 Michigan; MTF database 
1980-2007 
Harmfulness of having five or more 
drinks once or twice each weekend 
(% of respondents who say great 
risk) 
43.44 43.30 3.77 Michigan, MTF database 
1980-2007 
 
Tobacco 
Tobacco consumption (US per 
capita in pieces) 
 
2087.08 2033.22 444.35 www.usda.gov 
1980-2007 
Note: this is the primary measure used in 
regressions 
% of people who smoked cigarettes 
in the past week 
 
28.71 29.00 5.05 www.gallup.com 
1980-2007 
Smoke at least one pack per day (as 
% of those individuals who have 
smoked at least once in the past 30 
days) 
 
48.37 49.75 9.42 Michigan, NSDUH database 
1982-2007 
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Perceived danger of second hand 
smoke (% of respondents) 
 
49.36 51.50 6.36 www.gallup.com 
1994-2007 
Smoking should be made illegal (% 
of respondents) 
 
13.22 13.00 1.70 www.gallup.com 
1990-2007 
 
Risk if smoke one or more pack of 
cigarettes per day (% of 
respondents who say little or no 
risk)** 
 
8.42 8.55 1.85 Michigan, NSDUH database 
1985-2007 
Disapproval of people over age 18 
smoking one or more packs of 
cigarettes per day (% of 
respondents) 
 
72.45 71.95 3.72 Michigan, MTF database 
1980-2007 
How much do you think people risk 
harming themselves by smoking 
one or more packs of cigarettes per 
day (% of respondents who say 
great risk) 
69.10 68.65 4.55 Michigan, MTF database 
1980-2007 
 
Gaming 
Gaming consumption (visitor 
volume to Las Vegas as % of total 
US population) 
 
9.46 10.71 
 
2.95 www.lvcva.com  
1980-2007 
Note : this is primary measure used in 
regressions 
Casino Visitation (average number 
of  annual trips to casinos per US 
gambler) 
5.45 5.70 0.97 www.americangaming.org 
1993-2007 
  
Note:  * Source Michigan stands for www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/SAMHDA/sda 
** To be consistent with other questions, this measure is transferred to % of respondents who consider 
smoking risky by subtracting the percentage from 1 in correlation table 2, panel B.   
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Table 2. 
Correlations between Consumption of Sin Products and Gallup/SAMHSA/American 
Gaming Association Survey Results 
 
This table presents the correlation between the consumption of sin products (used as primary social norm measure) 
and the survey responses collected by Gallup Corporation, the Office of Applied Studies, Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), of the United States Department of Health and Human Services, 
based at the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR), and the American Gaming 
Association in different sample periods. 
  
Panel A. Correlations between macro-consumption data and the survey results of people’s consumption of sin 
products 
 
Survey Questions Sin products 
  Alcohol Tobacco Gaming 
Number of drinks in last 7 days (around date of survey) 0.74   
Have had a drink within past 30 days (%) 0.73   
Over the last two weeks, how many times have you had 
at least five drinks in a row (% of respondents) 
0.89   
% of people who smoked cigarettes in the past week  0.96  
Smoke at least one pack per day (as % of those 
individuals who have smoked at least once in the past 30 
days)  
 0.93  
Average number of annual trips to casinos per US 
gambler 
  0.80 
  
Panel B. Correlations between macro-consumption data and the survey results of people’s attitude towards 
sin 
 
Survey Questions Sin products 
  Alcohol Tobacco 
Has drinking ever been a cause of problem in your 
family (% of respondents) 
-0.66  
Disapproval of people over age of 18 who try one or two 
drinks of an alcoholic beverage (% of respondents) 
-0.78  
Disapproval of people over age of 18 who have five or 
more drinks once or twice each weekend (% of 
respondents) 
-0.71  
Harmfulness of trying one or two drinks of an alcoholic 
beverage (% of respondents who say great risk) 
-0.76  
Harmfulness of having five or more drinks once or twice 
each weekend (% of respondents who say great risk) 
-0.70  
Perceived danger of second hand smoke (% of 
respondents) 
 -0.77 
Smoking should be made illegal (% of respondents)  -0.57 
Risk if smoke one or more pack of cigarettes per day (% 
of respondents) 
 -0.93 
Disapproval of people over age 18 smoking one or more 
packs of cigarettes per day (% of respondents) 
 -0.42 
How much do you think people risk harming themselves 
by smoking one or more packs of cigarettes per day (% 
of respondents who say great risk) 
 -0.92 
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Table 3. 
Summary Statistics 
Institutional ownership is the fraction of shares of a firm held by institutions. Analyst coverage is the log of one plus the number of analyst estimates issued on a 
company at the end of the year. Alcohol consumption is the recorded adult (15+) per capita consumption of alcohol in gallons. Tobacco consumption is the domestic 
per capita consumption of tobacco in pieces. Gaming consumption is the number of gaming visitors to Las Vegas as a % of the total population. Financial 
performance is the market-adjusted return over one-year calculated by subtracting market return from a firm’s buy-and-hold return. Size is the logarithm of the 
market capitalization of the company. Beta is the firm’s industry market beta. Inverse of stock price is one over the stock price at the end of the year. Std of return 
is the daily stock return standard deviation during the year. Return on assets is calculated as earnings before extraordinary items, divided by lagged total assets. 
Growth rate of assets is calculated as the change in assets scaled by lagged assets. External financing activities are measured by the sum of net cash received from 
equity and debt issuance scaled by total assets.  
 
 
    Alcohol   Tobacco   Gaming 
Variable   Mean Median StdDev   Mean Median StdDev   Mean Median StdDev 
Institutional Ownership 0.181 0.175 0.237  0.341 0.412 0.298  0.274 0.289 0.298 
Analyst Coverage 1.139 1.014 1.105  1.966 1.914 1.160  1.527 1.479 1.034 
Consumption (Social norm proxy) 2.366 2.254 0.215  2087 2012 444  9.457 10.212 2.947 
Financial performance 0.006 0.005 0.037  0.009 0.008 0.033  0.001 0.001 0.052 
Size  12.619 11.241 2.065  14.391 13.699 2.261  12.409 12.763 1.717 
Beta  0.657 0.621 0.280  0.741 0.845 0.315  1.339 1.219 0.497 
Inverse of stock price 0.118 0.108 0.220  0.051 0.049 0.080  0.172 0.196 0.267 
Std of return 0.026 0.033 0.015  0.021 0.023 0.011  0.036 0.038 0.016 
Return on assets 0.053 0.047 0.074  0.103 0.124 0.113  0.033 0.029 0.151 
Growth rate of assets 0.137 0.124 0.439  0.125 0.117 0.404  0.373 0.457 0.905 
External financing activities 0.005 0.004 0.141   -0.045 -0.022 0.150   0.096 0.101 0.242 
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Table 4. 
Regression Analyses of Institutional Ownership and Analyst Coverage on Social Norms 
This table presents the OLS (negative binomial) regressions of institutional ownership (analyst coverage) on social norms and control variables for the full sample. 
The dependent variables in Model 1A and 1B are institutional ownership and analyst coverage, respectively. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Hypothesis 
1A is tested in the first six columns. Hypothesis 1B is tested in the next six columns.  The t-statistics (z-statistics) in all regression models are adjusted for firm-
level clustering. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at one, five, and ten percent levels (two-tailed) respectively. 
 
  1A  1B 
   Dependent Variable : Institutional ownership   Dependent Variable : Analyst coverage 
  Alcohol   Tobacco   Gaming    Alcohol   Tobacco   Gaming   
Variable  Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value  Estimate z-value Estimate z-value Estimate z-value 
                   
Social norms   0.322*  1.74   0.388***  3.05    0.049***  5.32   1.016** 2.30   0.742***  3.03   0.082**  2.19 
Size   0.059***  2.77    0.051***  2.91    0.059**  2.53   0.487*** 3.87   0.468***  3.92   0.461***  3.89 
Beta   0.068  1.35    0.062  1.59    0.007  1.24   0.147 1.38   0.383  1.15   0.098*  1.76 
Inverse of stock price -0.040 -0.38   -0.262 -0.73   -0.086 -1.16   0.078 0.22   0.089  0.13  -0.228 -0.78 
Std of return  -0.978*** -3.10   -6.838* -1.89  -2.065** -2.18   9.365 1.25   1.108  0.68   2.654  1.32 
NASD   0.028  0.51   -0.189 -1.54   -0.070 -0.20   -0.575** -2.39   -0.529  -1.41  -0.187 -1.53 
SP500  -0.089*** -3.18   -0.030*** -3.30   -0.100* -1.74   0.184*** 2.85   0.490  1.54   0.129**  2.19 
Lagged return on assets  0.049  0.81    0.120   0.77    0.104  1.21   0.084 0.99   0.765  0.97   0.378*  1.92 
Growth rate of assets -0.087 -1.32   -0.123* -1.90    -0.030 -1.49  -0.210 -1.43  -0.281 -0.21  -0.119* -1.90 
External financing activities  0.041  0.29  0.332**   2.23    -0.021 -0.34   0.427 1.00  -0.777* -1.86  -0.004 -0.02 
Dividends  0.002***  4.27  0.017**   2.02     0.031***  3.70   0.109 0.18    0.365  0.71    0.176  0.89 
Interest rate   0.001  0.28    0.002   0.33     0.001  0.31   0.018 1.22    0.276  1.45    0.162  0.76 
Market volatility   0.029  1.12    0.035   0.99     0.022  1.19  -0.031 -1.36  -0.407 -1.05  -0.398 -0.96 
GDP  0.000  1.40    0.000   1.01     0.000  0.97   0.000 1.02    0.000*  1.70    0.000  0.69 
Unemployment -0.057 -1.20   -0.041 -0.64    -0.029 -1.28  -0.283** -2.36   -0.368* -1.90  -0.582** -2.22 
Intercept  -1.938* -1.76    -1.574***   -4.87     -1.193  -0.28  -0.365*** -4.81   -1.746*** -3.97  -2.490*** -3.10 
                   
Firm fixed effect  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
N  452   222   585   452   222   585  
Adj R-Square/ Pseudo  R-Square 0.260     0.583     0.372     0.441     0.780     0.717   
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Table 5. 
Regression Analyses of Institutional Ownership and Analyst Coverage on Social Norms and Performance Weakness 
This table presents the OLS (negative binomial) regressions of institutional ownership (analyst coverage) on social norms, performance weakness and control 
variables for the full sample. The dependent variables in Model 2A and 2B are institutional ownership and analyst coverage, respectively. All variables are defined 
in the Appendix. Hypothesis 2A is tested in the first six columns. Hypothesis 2B is tested in the next six columns.  The t-statistics (z-statistics) in all regression 
models are adjusted for firm-level clustering. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent levels (two-tailed) respectively. 
  2A  2B 
    Dependent Variable : Institutional ownership   Dependent Variable : Analyst coverage 
  Alcohol   Tobacco   Gaming    Alcohol   Tobacco   Gaming   
Variable  Estimate t-value   Estimate 
t-
value   Estimate 
t-
value  Estimate 
z-
value   Estimate 
z-
valu
e 
  Estimate z-value 
Social norms    0.310**  2.37    
0.461*** 
  3.48   0.067***   5.11    1.183***  2.66   0.746***  3.81   0.127**  2.25 
Performance weakness -5.731*** -4.29  -5.837*** -11.21  -3.672***  -5.89  -3.849*** -2.78  -1.647** -2.02  -0.650* -1.64 
    1.289***  7.28  0.462**   2.18  0.056**   2.35    0.273***  3.29  0.178*  1.72   0.038***  3.67 
Social norms 
*performance  weakness     
Size     0.110***  4.29  0.031** 2.18    0.102***   4.28    0.748***  7.31    0.628***  5.90   0.389***   3.54 
Beta     0.070  1.43   0.067   1.07   -0.006  -0.29    0.181  0.84     0.338  1.58  -0.079 -0.68 
Inverse of stock price   -0.034 -0.34  -0.276  -1.01   -0.014  -0.22    0.222  0.70    -0.516 -0.99  -0.482  -1.41 
Std of return  -1.159* -1.79  -7.283**  -2.01   -4.283***  -5.28  12.374**  2.06    -3.227 -0.49  -2.139  -0.49 
NASD     -0.052   -0.81  -0.134  -1.41   -0.029  -0.29  -0.628**  -2.38    -0.709*  -
1.89 
 -0.190*  -1.67 
SP500    -0.099 -1.17  -0.218***  -2.60   -0.079  -1.63    0.190  0.61     0.320  1.05    0.040   0.36 
Lagged return on assets 0.028   0.53    0.176   1.15     0.048  0.40   -0.098 -0.20  0.803  1.48  0.410*  1.83 
Growth rate of assets   -0.070 -1.13  -0.110*  -1.78  -0.039* -1.83   -0.221 -1.18    -0.067 -0.33  -0.109* -1.77 
External financing activities 0.067  0.51   0.390**   2.09     0.011  0.14     0.572  1.34    -0.520 -1.29    0.061  0.30 
Dividends    0.013*  1.74   0.016**   2.00     
0.047*** 
  4.95     0.147  0.37  0.339  0.62    0.158  0.68 
Interest rate  0.001  0.28    0.002   0.33     0.001   0.32     0.027  1.41  0.303  1.62    0.179  0.83 
Market volatility 0.028  1.10    0.034   0.98     0.024  1.30    -0.056 -1.46    -0.399 -1.00   -0.467  -1.23 
GDP 0.000  1.53    0.000   1.14     0.000  1.03     0.000  1.28    0.000*  1.67    0.000  0.72 
Unemployment    -0.017 -1.31   -0.011  -0.71    -0.031  -1.55    -0.171*** -3.17    -0.374** -2.37   -0.422***  -5.01 
Intercept     -2.37*** -3.37    3.83***   8.37     2.98  1.08    -1.56  -1.33    -2.55*** -5.79   -3.67***  -6.90 
                   
Firm fixed effect Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
N  447   220   554   447   220   554  
Adj R-Square/                  
Pseudo  R-Square 0.259     0.590     0.396     0.447     0.779     0.745   
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Table 6. 
Regression Analyses of Institutional Ownership for Subgroups 
This table presents the OLS regressions of institutional ownership on social norms, performance weakness, and control variables for two subgroups. For the first 
six columns, the dependent variable is the fraction of shares held by type 1 (banks), type 2 (insurance companies), and type 5 (others including pension plans, 
endowments, and employee-ownership plans) institutions. For the next six columns, the dependent variable is the fraction of shares held by type 3 (mutual funds) 
and type 4 (independent investment advisors) institutions. All variables are defined in the Appendix. The t-statistics in all regression models are adjusted for firm-
level clustering. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent levels (two-tailed) respectively. 
 
Panel A. OLS regressions of institutional ownership on social norms 
    Dependent Variable : Institutional ownership (Type 1+2+5)   Dependent Variable : Institutional ownership (Type 3+4) 
  Alcohol   Tobacco   Gaming    Alcohol   Tobacco   Gaming   
Variable  Estimate t-value  Estimate t-value  Estimate t-value  Estimate t-value  Estimate t-value  Estimate t-value 
Social norms    0.276** 2.20   0.689***  3.11   0.034***  3.74  0.014  0.22  0.147**  2.41  0.004  1.07 
Size     0.059*** 3.64    0.028  1.59   0.049*** 3.20     0.010  1.37      0.080***  3.30  0.019  0.76 
Beta    -0.021** -2.00  -0.117 -1.63    -0.049** -2.28     0.084**  2.28      0.192***  3.29  0.058***  3.67 
Inverse of stock price   -0.026 -0.45  -0.048  -0.21  -0.019 -0.32    -0.047 -0.48  -0.213 -1.01  -0.054** -2.39 
Std of return    -0.987 -1.28  -5.320*  -1.78    -1.367** -1.97  0.090  0.19  -0.721 -0.59  -0.765 -1.17 
NASD     -0.004 -0.10  -0.127  -1.28     -0.005  -0.14  -0.029  -0.78  -0.038 -0.87  -0.031 -0.65 
SP500   -0.048** -2.11  -0.152**  -2.04     -0.033* -1.92  -0.040 -1.15     -0.216*** -2.75  -0.019 -0.33 
Lagged return on assets    0.029 0.37  -0.028 -0.19   0.100  1.42  0.020  1.19  0.154  1.44  0.006  0.15 
Growth rate of assets -0.098 -1.39  -0.029  -0.87  -0.009 -0.65   -0.036* -1.78     -0.088** -2.23  -0.017* -1.66 
External financing activities  0.049 0.39  0.196*  1.83  -0.064 -1.61  0.021  0.48     0.219**  2.30  0.028  1.10 
Dividends     0.003*** 5.89  0.021**  2.44      0.030***  3.18  0.001  1.58  0.014**  2.10  0.033***  3.41 
Interest rate  0.001 0.27   0.002  0.34  0.001 0.30  0.001  0.49      0.002  1.10  0.001  0.34 
Market volatility 0.034 1.37   0.041  1.10  0.049  1.29  0.026  1.16       0.033  1.17  0.018  0.89 
GDP    0.000 1.49   0.000*  1.66      0.000  0.82     0.000  1.45  0.000  0.64    0.000  0.74 
Unemployment -0.095 -1.38  -0.038 -1.10  -0.041 -1.30  -0.026 -0.92   -0.010 -0.36  -0.026 -0.84 
Intercept   2.647** 2.48   2.183***  3.64  1.173  0.38  2.913  0.29      1.986***  2.99  2.176  0.28 
                   
Firm fixed effect Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
N  452   222   585   452   222   585  
Adj R-Square 0.302     0.574     0.391     0.111     0.415     0.127   
                  
T-test of difference in 0.262*** 5.24  0.542*** 8.16  0.030*** 7.03          
coefficients (Social norms)                  
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Table 6 (continued). 
Panel B. OLS regressions of institutional ownership on social norms and performance weakness 
    Dependent Variable : Institutional ownership (Type 1+2+5)   Dependent Variable : Institutional ownership (Type 3+4) 
  Alcohol   Tobacco   Gaming    Alcohol   Tobacco   Gaming   
Variable  Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
                   
Social norms   0.279**  2.22   0.365***  3.96   0.035***  3.29   0.015  0.27     0.042*  1.87   0.003 0.54 
Performance weakness -5.268**  -2.17  -3.765*** -3.27  -0.328*** -2.87  -2.453 -0.79  -0.521 -0.17  -0.165 -0.68 
Social norms 
 1.367*** 2.67  0.276* 1.83  0.048** 2.27  0.963 1.36  0.152 1.42  0.004 1.18 
*performance  weakness     
Size    0.060***  4.02    0.024***  3.11   0.038***  2.81  0.018  1.28   0.030***   2.95   0.006 0.52 
Beta  -0.019* -1.90   -0.110* -1.91  -0.063*** -2.83   0.114***  2.75   0.170***   3.73   0.068*** 3.92 
Inverse of stock price -0.017  0.27   -0.083 -0.48    0.011  0.29  -0.029 -0.54  -0.190 -1.03  -0.034 -1.37 
Std of return  -1.156 -1.43  -5.295** -2.01  -2.291***  -2.62  0.081  0.21  -0.890 -0.84  -1.349* -1.94 
NASD   -0.012  -0.39   -0.084 -1.03    -0.003  -0.09  -0.030  -0.91  -0.057 -1.28  -0.010 -0.49 
SP500  -0.049*** -3.80   -0.161** -2.02   -0.062 -0.44  -0.052 -1.41  -0.121** -2.41  -0.020 -0.34 
Lagged return on assets   0.015  0.31   -0.010 -0.12    0.079  0.79  0.025  1.08    0.164*  1.65  -0.011 -0.37 
Growth rate of assets -0.054 -1.38  -0.038 -0.85  -0.028  -1.26  -0.020 -0.68  -0.066** -2.31  -0.017* -1.75 
External financing activities   0.061  0.58    0.231*  1.84  -0.048  -1.15  0.022  0.37    0.218**  2.19    0.060 1.31 
Dividends    0.002***  2.71    0.016**  2.18    0.027***   2.82  0.021***  3.17    0.017**  2.21  0.056*** 4.97 
Interest rate    0.001  0.29  0.002  0.31    0.001   0.29  0.001  0.27    0.002  1.21  0.001 0.38 
Market volatility   0.031  1.29  0.035  1.20    0.038  1.32  0.025  1.07    0.032  1.03  0.020 1.02 
GDP   0.000  1.51    0.000*  1.73    0.000  1.09  0.000  1.60    0.000  0.79     0.000 0.54 
Unemployment  -0.087 -1.55  -0.029 -1.14   -0.039 -1.48  -0.019 -1.02   -0.003 -0.22  -0.022 -1.01 
Intercept    3.649***  2.90    2.364***  3.07    1.226  0.27  1.163  1.11    2.191*  1.90  1.922 0.28 
                   
Firm fixed effect Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
N  447   220   554   447   220   554  
Adj R-Square 0.313     0.581     0.433     0.130     0.429     0.142   
                  
T-test of difference in  0.264*** 5.31  0.323*** 4.20  0.032*** 7.23          
coefficients (Social norms)                  
                  
T-test of difference in 0.404*** 2.78  0.124** 2.10  0.044** 2.19          
coefficients (Social norms*                  
performance weakness)                   
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Table 7. 
Time-Varying Measure of Firms’ Sin Exposure  
This table presents the OLS (negative binomial) regressions of institutional ownership (analyst coverage) on social norms, performance weakness, firms’ sin 
exposure and control variables for the full sample. Sin Exposure equals 1 if the firm’s revenue generated by sin segments, as a percentage of the firm’s total revenue, 
is greater than the industry median for the year; and 0 otherwise. The dependent variables in Models I and II are institutional ownership and analyst coverage, 
respectively. All variables are defined in the Appendix. The t-statistics (z-statistics) in all regression models are adjusted for firm-level clustering. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent levels (two-tailed) respectively. 
 
Panel A. Regression analyses of institutional ownership and analyst coverage on social norms and sin exposure 
 1A  1B 
  Dependent Variable : Institutional ownership   Dependent Variable : Analyst coverage 
 Alcohol  Tobacco  Gaming   Alcohol  Tobacco  Gaming  
Variable Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value  Estimate z-value Estimate z-value Estimate z-value 
                  
Social norms      0.271*  1.65   0.322***  3.25    0.038*** 3.28  0.812*  1.65  0.603** 2.38   0.072*  1.84 
Sin exposure    -0.421*** -3.76  -0.288*** -4.89  -0.331** -2.10  -0.267* -1.77  -0.309*** -3.05  -0.288*** -2.87 
Social norms*Sin exposure    0.389***  3.11  0.461***  4.01  0.067***   5.99    1.287**  2.18   0.868*** 3.49    0.094**  2.16 
Size    0.059***  2.77     0.050***  2.90    0.057***  2.51   0.494*** 3.90   0.471*** 3.95   0.472***  3.93 
Beta  0.069  1.36     0.063  1.58  0.007 1.22  0.152 1.58  0.391 1.18   0.090*  1.77 
Inverse of stock price -0.042 -0.37  -0.258 -0.75  -0.085 -1.15  0.079 0.22  0.090 0.15  -0.231 -0.83 
Std of return -0.980*** -3.14   -6.841* -1.92  -2.067** -2.26  9.374 1.26  1.116 0.72   2.543  1.29 
NASD -0.029  -0.52  -0.188 -1.54  -0.080 -0.29  -0.577** -2.41  -0.531 -1.42  -0.188 -1.54 
SP500 -0.088*** -3.17   -0.030*** -3.32   -0.105* -1.75   0.189*** 2.89  0.490 1.55   0.141**  2.35 
Lagged return on assets 0.049  0.81     0.123  0.78     0.106  1.29  0.085 0.99  0.768 0.99    0.384**  2.04 
Growth rate of assets -0.084 -1.33    -0.124* -1.93   -0.030 -1.49  -0.216 -1.47  -0.281 -0.21  -0.129** -1.98 
External financing activities 0.042  0.30    0.331**  2.23   -0.020 -0.32  0.428 1.03  -0.782* -1.95  -0.004 -0.02 
Dividends 0.002***  4.29    0.018**  2.15     0.032***  3.73  0.117 0.26  0.365 0.71   0.176  0.89 
Interest rate 0.001  0.31     0.002  0.35     0.001  0.31  0.019 1.23  0.276 1.45   0.162  0.76 
Market volatility 0.030  1.14     0.036  0.98     0.026  1.24  -0.031 -1.36  -0.407 -1.05  -0.398 -0.97 
GDP 0.000  1.42     0.000  1.01  0.000  0.97  0.000 1.05    0.000* 1.81   0.000  0.69 
Unemployment  -0.058 -1.23   -0.045 -0.65  -0.030 -1.29  -0.284** -2.39  -0.368* -1.92  -0.588** -2.24 
Intercept  -1.919* -1.82     1.562***  4.82  1.184  0.19   0.375*** 4.91  -1.788*** -3.87  -2.512*** -3.41 
                  
Firm fixed effect Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
N 452   222   585   452   222   585  
Adj R-Square/ Pseudo  R-Square 0.262     0.586     0.375     0.442     0.782     0.719   
 
  
46 
 
Table 7 (continued). 
Panel B. Regression analyses of institutional ownership and analyst coverage on social norms, sin exposure and performance weakness 
 2A  2B 
  Dependent Variable : Institutional ownership   Dependent Variable : Analyst coverage 
 Alcohol Tobacco Gaming   Alcohol Tobacco Gaming   
Variable Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value  Estimate z-value Estimate z-value Estimate z-value 
              
Social norms   0.465** 2.11   0.401*** 3.02  0.054*** 4.14  1.004*** 2.07 0.615** 2.06   0.108**   2.01 
Performance weakness  -5.062*** -4.05 -5.736***  -8.29 -3.619*** -3.09  -3.593**  -2.41  -1.322*  -1.87 -0.549  -1.52 
Social norms*performance  weakness   1.139*** 5.16   0.449*  1.78   0.042* 1.92    0.231*** 2.96    0.138*    1.71  0.028**  2.18 
Sin exposure  -0.399** -2.32 -0.251*** -2.65 -0.219** -1.98  -0.201 -1.59 -0.216** -2.17  -0.164*  -1.95 
Social norms*Sin exposure   0.501**  2.11   0.529***  3.68  0.076*** 4.26   1.292*** 2.89    0.875***   3.93  0.145*** 2.61 
Performance weakness*Sin exposure   -6.387*** -5.95 -5.922*** -9.16  -3.717*** -3.59  -4.012*** -2.87   -1.921***  -2.98  -0.752* -1.89 
Social norms*performance               
weakness*Sin exposure   1.438***  4.82  0.471**  2.03 0.069** 2.41   0.297*** 3.52    0.219***   2.77   0.049*** 2.72 
Size   0.111***  4.29  0.038**    2.44   0.138*** 4.68   0.759*** 7.82    0.636***   5.96   0.399***   3.61 
Beta  0.093*  1.79  0.068   1.18 -0.006 -0.31  0.193  0.98     0.338   1.58   -0.079  -0.69 
Inverse of stock price   -0.034 -0.42  -0.282 -1.28 -0.015 -0.23  0.225  0.72 -0.516  -0.99   -0.482 -1.41 
Std of return   -1.168** -1.99 -7.304** -2.55   -4.276*** -5.18    12.362**  2.18 -3.187  -0.42   -2.287 -0.63 
NASD   -0.053 - 0.82 -0.136 -1.42   -0.026 -0.24   -0.639** -2.55    -0.711*  -1.93   -0.229** -2.06 
SP500   -0.101 -1.27  -0.219***  -2.64 -0.085* -1.84  0.192 0.62     0.320  1.05    0.044  0.38 
Lagged return on assets    0.039  0.89 0.186   1.38 0.048 0.45  -0.098 -0.21     0.803  1.48    0.419*  1.87 
Growth rate of assets   -0.070  -1.14 -0.128* -1.82 -0.038* -1.83  -0.227 -1.25    -0.067 -0.33   -0.109* -1.79 
External financing activities  0.068  0.52  0.395**   2.28 0.011 0.14    0.572  1.34    -0.520 -1.29    0.061  0.32 
Dividends    0.014*  1.75  0.019**    2.18    0.048***  4.96  0.147  0.37     0.339  0.62    0.158  0.68 
Interest rate  0.001  0.28   0.002   0.35 0.001  0.32  0.027  1.41     0.303 1.62    0.179 0.83 
Market volatility  0.028  1.15 0.034   0.98 0.025 1.37  -0.056 -1.45    -0.399 -1.03    -0.467 -1.23 
GDP    0.000  1.53 0.000   1.14 0.000 1.03  0.000  1.24 0.000* 1.68  0.000  0.72 
Unemployment -0.017 -1.32 -0.017  -0.96 -0.031 -1.56   -0.176*** -3.29   -0.395** -2.46   -0.429*** -5.16 
Intercept   -2.310*** -3.02    3.701***   8.27 2.510 1.36  1.489  1.28     -2.127*** -4.29    -3.091*** -6.37 
              
Firm fixed effect Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  
N 447  220  554   447  220  554  
Adj R-Square/ Pseudo  R-Square 0.261   0.591   0.397     0.447   0.781   0.746   
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Table 8. 
Changes Analyses 
This table presents the OLS (negative binomial) regressions of change in institutional ownership (change in analyst coverage) on change in social norms, change 
in performance weakness, and change in control variables for the full sample. All variables are defined in the Appendix. The t-statistics (z-statistics) in all regression 
models are adjusted for firm-level clustering. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at one percent, five and ten percent levels (two-tailed) respectively. 
 
Panel A. Regression analyses of change in institutional ownership and change in analyst coverage on change in social norms 
  1A  1B 
    Dependent Variable : Change in institutional ownership   Dependent Variable : Change in analyst coverage 
  Alcohol   Tobacco   Gaming    Alcohol   Tobacco   Gaming   
Variable  Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value  Estimate z-value Estimate z-value Estimate z-value 
                   
ΔSocial norms 0.318*  1.64    0.100  1.33   0.024**  2.10   0.383* 1.90   0.273*  1.78     0.043* 1.86 
ΔSize     0.078***  6.89    0.039**  2.19   0.037**  2.34   0.292** 2.19   0.273*  1.90   0.187**   2.36 
Δbeta     0.021  1.01    0.036  1.41   0.004 1.19   0.072 1.05   0.372  0.98     0.087* 1.68 
ΔInverse of stock price   -0.052 -0.61   -0.219 -0.62  -0.071  -1.26   0.054  0.18   0.067  0.11    -0.171  -0.37 
ΔStd of return  -0.473** -2.16   -1.038 -1.26  -0.732* -1.83   3.092  0.78   0.938  0.37     1.728 1.01 
ΔLagged return on assets    0.021  0.55    0.082  0.43    0.089  1.11   0.064  0.79   0.183  0.25     0.362 1.18 
ΔGrowth rate of assets   -0.038 -1.12   -0.042 -1.61   -0.018 -1.20  -0.291 -1.10  -0.239 -0.18    -0.104*  -1.85 
ΔExternal financing activities    0.020  0.16    0.102*  1.92   -0.014 -0.26   0.182  0.28  -0.435 -1.42    -0.002  -0.01 
ΔDividends     0.036*  1.78    0.041**  2.01    0.010**  2.20   0.112  0.27   0.173  0.63     0.261* 1.78 
ΔInterest rate    0.001  0.18    0.001  0.59  0.001  0.66   0.019 1.18   0.028  1.55     0.017 1.28 
ΔMarket volatility    0.016  0.84    0.021  0.90  0.019  0.38  -0.029 -1.46  -0.025* -1.66    -0.018  -1.57 
ΔGDP    0.000  1.31    0.000  0.93  0.000  0.67    0.000  1.02   0.000  0.37     0.000 0.68 
ΔUnemployment   -0.028 -0.97   -0.031 -0.38   -0.019 -1.17  -0.172* -1.80  -0.436 -1.37    -0.253**  -1.99 
Intercept    -0.156** -2.33    0.173***  3.76  0.256  0.19  0.036**  2.30  -1.111*** -2.62    -0.361  -1.43 
                   
Firm fixed effect Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
N  437   210   553   437   210   553  
Adj R-Square/ Pseudo  R-Square 0.140     0.212     0.149     0.183     0.132     0.111   
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Table 8 (continued). 
Panel B. Regression analyses of change in institutional ownership and change in analyst coverage on change in social norms and change in performance 
weakness 
  2A  2B 
    Dependent Variable : Change in institutional ownership   Dependent Variable : Change in analyst coverage 
  Alcohol   Tobacco   Gaming    Alcohol   Tobacco   Gaming   
Variable  Estimate t-value   Estimate t-value   Estimate t-value  Estimate z-value   Estimate z-value   Estimate z-value 
                   
ΔSocial norms   0.173*  1.71   0.110  1.43    0.018*  1.77    0.291  1.32   0.219*  1.69   0.040*  1.70 
ΔPerformance weakness  -3.940** -2.02  -2.841*** -3.85  -1.638*** -4.29  -1.384** -2.16  -1.637** -1.98  -0.638 -1.39 
Δ(Social norms 
   1.040*  1.77   0.376**   2.05    0.060**  1.96   1.122** 2.14  0.102** 2.06   0.018* 1.90 
*Performance  weakness)     
ΔSize   0.069***  5.48   0.022*   1.72    0.028*  1.67   0.372*** 3.07   0.326*** 3.15   0.281*** 2.67 
Δbeta    0.018  0.94   0.059   1.22   -0.006 -0.29   0.092 1.26   0.317 1.47  -0.065 -1.39 
ΔInverse of stock price  -0.027 -0.19  -0.173 -0.89   -0.017 -0.24   0.051 0.16  -0.365 -0.66  -0.110 -0.41 
ΔStd of return  -0.283* -1.76  -1.273* -1.67   -1.029*** -2.77   3.917 0.62  -1.293 -0.38  -1.837 -1.21 
ΔLagged return on assets   0.043  0.93    0.064   0.38    0.019  0.18  -0.036  -0.21   0.540 1.17   0.191  0.99 
ΔGrowth rate of assets  -0.028 -0.89  -0.036 -1.51   -0.028* -1.80  -0.286 -1.09  -0.054 -0.31  -0.091* -1.79 
ΔExternal financing activities   0.035  0.26    0.100*   1.88    0.006  0.12   0.101 0.18  -0.573 -1.21   0.053 0.41 
ΔDividends    0.010  1.33    0.035   1.62    0.012**  2.38   0.103 0.28   0.288  1.24   0.317* 1.90 
ΔInterest rate   0.001  0.17    0.001   0.53    0.001  0.41   0.029 1.30   0.038*  1.71   0.022 1.48 
ΔMarket volatility   0.015  0.81    0.023   0.99    0.017  0.35  -0.019 -1.20  -0.020 -1.41  -0.026*  -1.73 
ΔGDP   0.000  1.38    0.000   0.99    0.000  1.00   0.000 1.28    0.000  1.61   0.000   0.70 
ΔUnemployment  -0.014 -0.67   -0.008 -0.27   -0.027 -1.49  -0.114* -1.75  -0.547* -1.73  -0.263***  -3.16 
Intercept   -0.120*** -5.18    0.181***   3.83    0.026**  2.01   0.117*** 2.59  -0.417 -1.56  -0.531*  -1.94 
                   
Firm fixed effect Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
N  432   208   522   432   208   522  
Adj R-Square/ Pseudo  R-Square 0.145     0.182     0.129     0.188     0.127     0.124   
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 Figure 1. Panel A: Alcohol 
 
 
 
     
Figure 1. Panel B: Tobacco 
 
 
 
 
-40%
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
2.0
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6
2.7
2.8
2.9
3.0
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Fi
na
nc
ial
 Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
Co
ns
um
pt
ion
Year
Alcohol ConsumptionFinancial Performance
-60%
-40%
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
2200
2400
2600
2800
3000
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Fi
na
nc
ial
 Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
Co
ns
um
pt
ion
Year
Tobacco ConsumptionFinancial Performance
  
50 
Figure 1. Panel C: Gaming 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Plots of Social Norm Measures and Time Series of Financial Performance of Sin Stocks. 
Alcohol consumption is the recorded adult (15+) per capita consumption of alcohol in gallons. Tobacco consumption is the 
domestic per capita consumption of tobacco in pieces. Gaming consumption is the number of gaming visitors to Las Vegas 
as a % of the total population. Financial performance is defined as the differences between the “sin” stock portfolio return 
and the market portfolio return. These plots cover the years 1980 to 2007.      
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Figure 2. Panel A. Univariate Analysis – Institutional Ownership Partitioned by Social Norm Measure and Financial 
Performance.   Institutional ownership is the fraction of shares of a firm held by institutions.   
 
 
 
Figure 2. Panel B. Univariate Analysis – Analyst Coverage Partitioned by Social Norm Measure and Financial Performance.  
Analyst coverage is the number of analyst estimates issued on a company as of year-end. 
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